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normalization), represents the best course of action to promote U.S. interests. Rather, they defend another solution -"Strategic Outreach" -as an alternative.
The status quo is rejected as being overly stringent and a carryover of the Cold War era that does more damage than good for the United States as a foreign policy tool.
Increasing punitive pressures in an attempt to bring democratic reforms is rejected as being counterproductive and responsive to only a vocal minority of Cuban expatriates, now American citizens. Immediate normalization of diplomatic relations is also seen as unfeasible, as Cuba and the United States have lacked normal and positive relations for such an extended period of time that the many necessary legal, economic and social frameworks do not exist to address very real problems that remain. The United States must immediately begin ironing out long-standing differences to better serve U.S.
interests in both the near-and long-term. This will take time and is the reason why the authors believe in the concept of Strategic Outreach.
Strategic Outreach is premised upon a model similar to the route embarked upon by the United States during normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam only twenty years after that war ended. It is a multi-phased, systematic approach that builds upon small, specific successes achieved in the near-term (defined as one to three years) in order to achieve the long-term (seven to ten years) goal of diplomatic normalization. In the near term, the U.S. and Cuba must initiate processes for building trust; for the long-term future, they must continue those processes to reduce long-existing hostilities.
A near-term clarification of our domestic political agenda is also an essential part of the plan. This will ensure that all interests are considered, not just those of a vocal iv minority. Regional and global entities must also be leveraged to bring about reforms expected of a participant in today's global community.
Recommendations are offered in four key areas, loosely premised upon the elements of national power (political, diplomatic, information, and economic) available for influence. First, a Presidential-appointed bipartisan committee should be convened to assess U.S.-Cuba policy and to recommend new legislation for the future if needed. The use of such a committee will ensure the needs and desires of the society as a whole are considered, and will also serve as a signal to all stakeholders that the U.S. is amenable to new solutions to its 40-year-old Cuban dilemma. With a clearer picture of national interests and discrete objectives, such a committee would also help determine the best means (i.e., unilateral changes in policy vs. quid pro quo exchanges) to achieve them, thus resulting in better policy.
Second, we must continue to exchange ideas and seek a "common ground" if we are to break this impasse. Outreach efforts in this area should include medical and health research; continued artistic, musical, athletic, and cultural exchanges; and government-to-government exchanges, especially with second echelon members in the Cuban regime who may very well be the leaders in power in the near future. Efforts should also include business-to-business exploration, and continued joint academic exploration of long-standing issues such as human rights violations, economic barriers to free enterprise, and reparations for nationalized properties.
Third, relaxation of punitive measures should be undertaken if our policy truly intends to assist the Cuban populace. Recommendations include easing our economic punishment (e.g., further relaxing trade restrictions on medical and humanitarian goods, v and removing the limits on remittances to Cuban citizens in order to fund a civil society); lifting the ban on personal travel to Cuba, encouraging foundation investment by relaxing licensing requirements, and encouraging non-governmental organizations (NGO) participation. Additionally, we should consider a sunset provision to the Helms-Burton Act as a reward for positive cooperation from the Cuban government on select issues.
Finally, the U.S. should enlist the aid of the international community, to include Caribbean, Latin and South American countries, if we truly want to break the impasse and maintain stability in the region. However, to achieve the support and leverage from the world body politic, the U.S. must be willing to turn this from a bilateral test of wills to a truly international issue. Many in the international community are against our present policy toward Cuba (for example, the World Trade Organization is staunchly against our current use of sanctions), and there is assistance to be gained if we welcome others into the debate. Mexico and other regional countries are defending the readmission of Cuba to the OAS; and Caribbean neighbors are eager to see Cuba step into a post-Marxist environment. We must consider using the power of the world community to break the present U.S.-Cuban zero-sum philosophy.
Introduction
History does indeed illustrate that those who do not, or choose not to, learn from the past are often doomed to repeat it. We suggest that United States-Cuba foreign policy provides just such an example. For more than four decades, the United States has pursued engagement with Cuba in a manner befitting the Cold War era, when missiles were pointed from that island nation toward our own cities. However, the Cold War has ended, and Russia, the once-feared chief sponsor of the communist ideology, is now allied with us in an effort to implement market reform and combat global terrorism. Yet, 90 miles off our coast, Cuba remains isolated by the United States. The potential problems looming on the horizon make this policy of isolation risky and ill advised.
By any rational measure, our Cuba policy has failed to accomplish anything other than to provide Castro with a convenient scapegoat. This has happened at the expense of the Cuban people and with the resulting paradoxical isolation of the United States on the world stage. This paper points to the failure of our "cold shoulder" policy toward Cuba and suggests that an alternative foreign policy be adopted using systematic analysis and problem-solving and negotiation techniques.
The U.S. has several potential policy options: continuing or further tightening the embargo; immediately terminating the current policy; or reaching out to Cuba through Strategic Outreach. The option of Strategic Outreach is the most practical and practicable option to implement.
Strategic Outreach addresses US-Cuba policy in a phased, systematic approach focused on near-, mid-, and long-term goals, with successive, incremental achievements required to reach those goals. The first phase of the approach, focused on near-term (one to three years) objectives, relies on building trust, bridging the information gap, and reducing the hostility that has grown between the countries over a 40-year period. The second phase of the approach, focused on mid-term (three to seven year) objectives, reaches out to U.S. residents and clarifies U.S. domestic policy with regard to Cuba. The third phase, focused on long-term (five plus years) objectives, involves Strategic Outreach efforts to implement new foreign policy through bilateral and multinational efforts. This timeline is important in that near-term and mid-term efforts will help build a foundation that will be essential in a post-Fidel environment. It's also important to note that most of these efforts are possible (and necessary) with or without the participation or endorsement of Fidel Castro.
The authors reject the status quo as being a remnant of the Cold War, and the imperfect result of a squabble between vocal domestic agenda advocates and foreign trade enthusiasts. 1 We also reject the option of increasing the pressures on Cuba through more rigid enforcement of sanctions, believing that would be counterproductive in achieving U.S. goals. The authors believe Cuba would dig in deeper, their citizens would continue to suffer; and the U.S. reputation on the world stage, already criticized vis-à-vis Cuba, would sink further. We also argue that immediate normalization is neither practical nor practicable, as common linchpins of governance and agreement do not exist between the two countries after a 40-year standoff. Strategic Outreach is defended as the optimal solution for a foreign policy that best serves the interests of the United States.
Strategic Outreach hinges on several key activities. A bipartisan commission commissioned by the President is essential to review current policy and make recommendations on a future course of action. Reducing the information and culture gap through joint academic and research efforts and continuing cultural exchange options are both essential to establishing trust and reducing the tension that has grown over the past four decades. Reliance on foundations and NGOs is necessary to sponsor neutral forums in which new ideas and lingering issues can be raised, debated, and resolved. Relaxation of some punitive measures that would aid the Cuban people (e.g., licensure requirements through the Treasury Department; easier visitation procedures for families; opening the door further for "cash and carry" humanitarian and medical sales, and removing the limits on remittances) is needed to signal to U.S. society, the Cuban government and populace, and world leaders at large that the U.S. is committed to resolving the long-standing problem. Finally, enlisting multinational aid to bring reforms to Cuba ensures that the final policy implementation will not be viewed by Cuba as a "U.S. dictated" change.
Implementation of each of these recommendations will not come easily, and will require a strategic approach with a clear, objective-based focus.
Findings: The Present Situation
Although 
Strategic Outreach Defined
Strategic Outreach, reduced to its simplest elements, is similar to a negotiation strategy that strives to create a satisfying solution for a number of parties with disparate and competing interests. In the U.S.-Cuba policy sphere, the involved parties have staked intractable claims over the years and have become so entrenched in their positions that a zero-sum philosophy prevails. The authors believe that a solution to this issue can only be achieved through a three-phased approach focused on achieving discrete, measurable goals satisfactory to all parties.
• Phase One requires low-level interactions between Cuban and U.S. government members and residents in order to build trust and understanding.
• Phase Two focuses on clarifying the U.S. domestic political position on Cuba, ascertaining what unilateral actions should be taken to further U.S. interests, and determining what quid pro quo events must occur to improve relations.
• Phase Three looks at implementing a comprehensive foreign policy toward Cuba that ensures national security, reflects the desires of U.S. citizens, and is accepted as reasonable on the world stage.
Phase One of Strategic Outreach involves the continuation of low-level interactions
that are short of formal diplomatic relations. Such constructive engagement serves to build trust between members of the Cuban and American governments, and seeks to reduce the information gap that has grown between the two countries over a 40-year period. 11 These low-level contacts, which have been conducted in the past in the art, athletic, and cultural arenas, help to build ties, reduce hostility, and identify common ground between parties. As long as the official rhetoric between our governments remains hostile, lower level diplomacy may very well offer the best hope for keeping the lines of communication flowing, and may provide the only platform upon which a lasting resolution may be built. This was critically important when normalizing diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and the authors believe a similar approach needs to be applied to U.S.-Cuban relations.
As well as reducing hostility and identifying common ground, such interaction is often the best low-risk means for the U.S. to signal intent domestically and internationally. As the first phase of Strategic Outreach, continued low-level interaction respects the notion of sovereignty, focuses on trust building, seeks similarities versus emphasizing differences, and sets the stage for long-term normalized diplomatic relations.
The history of the U.S.-Cuban standoff is long and complex. Unraveling the situation is an integral part of stepping forward. Therefore, the second phase of Strategic Outreach requires that an accurate assessment of the U.S.'s current policy be conducted.
However, assessing U.S. policy is not an easy task. Critics of our on-going 40-year embargo claim that any easement of the sanction has been skillfully prevented by a very vocal Cuban expatriate contingent in south Florida that is vehemently opposed to such a move. Thus, foreign policy has become hostage to internal, domestic politics.
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A key part then of the Strategic Outreach approach requires that the U.S. domestic agenda be clarified with regard to U.S.-Cuban policy. Numerous polls indicate that the American public at large wants a policy toward Cuba that is more rational and less extreme than the present law embodied in the Helms-Burton Act.
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The business community has long wanted to explore opportunities in Cuba, and the political community has become more vocal as of late about change as well. However, wellorganized groups such as the Cuban American National Foundation have held a lock on the legislative agenda for years. Clearly, a sound foreign policy toward Cuba cannot be based on the emotional rhetoric of a vocal minority, but should rather be reflective of the desires of the American populace as a whole.
Thus, Phase Two of Strategic Outreach aims to clarify the U.S. domestic agenda with regard to Cuba by actively "reaching out" to the American society, not just a few special interest groups with their own prioritized objectives. The authors believe that prior to turning attention outside U.S. borders to exercise this foreign policy, the U.S. must first ensure that the policy reasonably strives to attain domestic objectives, and that it works in concert with macro-level foreign policy. "Reaching out" to the citizenship ensures that will be accomplished, and provides a roadmap of those actions that can reasonably be achieved unilaterally (e.g., the possible cessation of the travel ban), and those actions that would continue to be negotiable points with Cuba.
Phase Three of Strategic Outreach focuses on implementing a clearly defined foreign policy toward Cuba based on a more stable, secure and mutually beneficial relationship.
The authors believe that through continued outreach efforts and with a clarified domestic agenda the United States could begin exercising a more refined foreign policy grounded in reality and based on current U.S. objectives. The third phase focuses on using bilateral and multilateral efforts to enact a foreign policy toward Cuba that the authors believe would be more in line with the present, pro-trade global approach the U.S. favors.
The authors also looked at three alternative courses of action that could be pursued:
• Maintaining the status quo, as presently embodied in the Helms-Burton Act.
• Tightening sanctions.
• Immediately normalizing relations.
The two aims of Helms-Burton are to "protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro Title IV forbids granting visas to corporate officers (and their family members) of firms that traffic in such property, and has rarely been enforced.
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The second alternative, to increase the pressure on Cuba by tightening sanctions, would essentially mean taking Helms-Burton and tightening several of its provisions.
For example, visitors are presently allowed to travel to Cuba for educational or humanitarian purposes, and it is common knowledge that travelers spend American dollars in Cuba outside the auspices of their sponsors' Treasury Department license. Sen.
Jesse Helms, (R-NC), has threatened to pursue the law more vigorously, close such loopholes, and even to amend the law to require implementation of Title III.
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The final option considered, to swiftly normalize relations between the countries by repealing Helms-Burton and establishing full diplomatic ties immediately, is selfexplanatory.
The authors believe that by taking the time to build solid relations, clarify domestic policy, and leverage the collective strength of trading partners, international bodies, and other third party intermediaries, the United States would stand a better chance of breaking through the current impasse and achieving national objectives versus the present or alternate approaches. Clearly, Strategic Outreach is the logical choice to pursue. 
Criteria and Assumptions
Our research, which looked closely at the model used in the normalization process with Vietnam (and to a lesser extent, a similar model used with China), allowed us to identify several criteria we believe are essential for establishing a reasonable policy toward Cuba. The authors believe that U.S. policy toward Cuba must possess the following characteristics:
• Must address national security concerns.
• Must be goal and objective-oriented.
• Must be realistic and feasible for both countries.
• Must use trust-building measures in a low-threat environment.
• Diligent investigation of issues is necessary due to complexity.
• Must be flexible to allow U.S. to adapt to shifting international landscape.
• Must begin prior to Castro's demise, to give emerging leaders the opportunity to exert influence.
• Must realistically consider the forces of globalization.
Based upon the preceding, we examined and rejected the aforementioned alternative foreign policy options, believing they did not meet the criteria for success. From a toplevel perspective, we believe Strategic Outreach is the optimal approach for examining all facets of the present U.S.-Cuba issue and offering realistic and reasonable solutions.
Other options tend to focus heavily on the short term, rely on measures that prolong the impasse, downplay the necessity to address Cuba as an integral member of the regional and international community, or fail to consider the opinions of numerous stakeholders.
In arriving at the decision that Strategic Outreach was the best approach for the U.S.
to adopt we operated under several assumptions. First, we assume no "smoking gun" exists within the classified realm that would make working with Cuba a no-go situation. therefore any policy option that will succeed must be flexible enough to adapt to a Cuba that is governed by Fidel, Raul, or any other successor. As Fidel's brother, co-leader of the revolution, and present day leader of Cuba's military, Raul is believed to be Fidel's likely successor. We presume he will receive the necessary Cuban constitutional approval to assume control upon Fidel's demise.
The final assumption considers that both Fidel and Raul appear content to allow midlevel members of the Cuban government, those most likely to rise to power in a postCastro environment, to engage in discourse with the U.S. government. Moderate government-to-government interchange has occurred between the two countries over the years despite the bitter rhetoric that often appears publicly. 18 With the issue framed by the authors' assumptions and criteria for successful policy, we can further analyze each policy option using the established criteria and demonstrate why we believe Strategic Outreach is the preferred path.
Must address National Security concerns.
Of specific importance to the U.S.-Cuba issue is the level of stability and predictability our foreign policy can provide, thus removing uncertainty and instability that presently overshadow future relations. Solid policy will mitigate the U.S.'s vulnerability to new or unforeseen risks, and will help alleviate Cuba's perception that the United States is dictating its affairs. Simultaneously, it will help remove the perception in the world's eyes that the extraterritorial legislation embodied in HelmsBurton is hypocritical. 19 An attempt to immediately restore diplomatic relations ignores that there are legitimate issues that need to be resolved between our two nations, and that a great level of wariness exists between the U.S. and Cuba -with good reason. As Ambassador Dennis Hays points out, "Our (American) older generation remembers this is a country that was willing to use nukes on us." 20 Cubans likewise point out the American support of the Batista regime, and are quick to remind us of the Bay of Pigs incident. Therefore, security becomes a key issue, and any policy option selected must acknowledge the fact that Cuba is important not just for trade, but because secondary issues -crime, drugs, migration, political expression, human rights -have a way of manifesting themselves by actions that affect our national interests.
Tightening sanctions or remaining on the present path ignores the fact that at some point we will have to deal with long-festering issues and a transition, which may not proceed as smoothly as we'd like. As Dr. Samuel Huntington notes, "Democracies don't fight each other -but emerging democracies do." 21 Strategic Outreach is the one option that directly addresses national security concerns.
By ensuring a thorough review of our own domestic agenda is accomplished, we can ensure that U.S. interests are considered and ultimately crafted into a foreign policy that is not "anti-Castro" as some scholars characterize our present approach, but pro-U.S.
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Must be goal and objective-oriented.
A balanced U.S.-Cuba foreign policy should consist of a clearly stated objective, the means by which the U.S. hopes to achieve that objective, and a feedback mechanism that will allow the government to assess effectiveness of the policy and adjust as needed. In the case of present U.S.-Cuba policy, the objectives (as embodied in Helms-Burton) are first to protect U.S. citizens from confiscation of properties and the illegal trafficking of said properties, accomplished through the embargo and isolation of the Cuban government, and then to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, accomplished by a loose collection of activities often referred to as "Track II"
actions (per their designation as the second of three platforms in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.) 23 Currently lacking is any articulation of how the U.S. measures the effectiveness of the approach.
The authors believe the goals of U.S. policy should be re-validated to determine their relevance in modern times. Only then should a course of action be developed which considers the balance between domestic needs and foreign policy. As Ambassador Cowal has publicly stated, "We shouldn't necessarily be concerned about reciprocity.
We should do what's right for the U.S." 24 Without ensuring that the present goals embodied in Helms-Burton remain relevant, there is no way to assess the law's effectiveness. To this day, opposing sides vehemently debate whether the embargo against Cuba has helped (or will help) hasten its demise and prepare it for democracy, or whether it has provided Castro with a convenient scapegoat for Cuba's societal ills. 25 On the world stage, many question the right of the US to "manage" the affairs of Cuba at all. 26 Efforts to reach out to the Cuban people appear disjointed and random, which also prevents any assessment of their effectiveness. One State Department official we spoke with claimed there was no effort to bring order to efforts conducted under Section 109 of Helms-Burton, which authorizes humanitarian efforts. 27 Without the State Department serving as a "clearing house" for activities, the role has been filled by non-governmental organizations that are clearly aligned with the interests of their own membership. This situation leaves the authors asking: Who ensures that the actions carried out within the boundaries of Helms-Burton are oriented toward achieving goals that are good for US interests? And without ensuring that the goals as presently stated are relevant, why do we continue on the same path we've pursued for 40 plus years?
We believe that immediately normalizing relations between the US and Cuba squanders an opportunity to negotiate real change and to weigh in on matters that the US holds as core values, while tightening sanctions intensifies an existing practice that has been a lightning rod for controversy. Strategic Outreach, however, focuses on first clarifying our goals, and then enacting measures that seek both near and long-term effects. The policy is designed such that successive, incremental steps can occur based on "negotiated" behavior. Strategic Outreach is a systematic attempt to bring structure to the "ad hoc approach to outreach" 28 the US is presently engaged in.
Must be realistic and feasible for both countries.
Strategic Outreach combines practicality, respect for sovereignty, and morality with a systematic problem-solving solution. While the present relationship between the U.S.
and Cuba prevents short-term political perturbations, the authors believe that in the long run, Strategic Outreach is the only approach that is both realistic and feasible. Until this issue is viewed as a whole, rather than just in bits and pieces (the "salami tactic"
criticized by Dan Fisk of the Heritage Foundation 29 ), we will not be able to assemble a strategy that is best focused on achieving U.S. objectives.
Our findings indicate that domestic politics have prevented the U.S. from embarking on a new path more in line with present objectives to better serve the U.S. Statistics appear to indicate the time is right to try something different. Ambassador Cowal cites 55% of Americans wanting an immediate lift of the embargo, 75% wanting incremental change, and 84% of the Cuban community in south Florida believing the embargo has failed. 30 In light of these statistics, and in conjunction with the other reasoning previously presented, we believe that further tightening the sanctions, or remaining on the present path is not realistic or feasible for our desired end results.
Must use trust-building measures in a low-threat environment.
In an address to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Alberto Coll of the U.S. Naval
War College argued that the Vietnam model used by the U.S. to influence relations with
Vietnam might have direct applicability to the present U.S.-Cuba situation. 31 Similar to that complex negotiation, points of agreement rather than points of dissension will be required to provide both the U.S. and Cuba with the stable footing necessary to move forward. Only through mutual agreement and dogged focus on several key points will the two nations be able to look past the ideological differences that overshadow them. In the 1980s, it was the U.S.'s desire to recover our MIAs and Vietnam's eventual openness to others outside the communist tent that allowed the two nations to embark on a path of normalization. 32 Strategic Outreach allows for each nation to search for mutually agreeable issues upon which a "negotiated" position could be arranged. Through the contacts envisioned in Phase I, potential areas of agreement can be discussed away from the public eye, thus allowing each nation a low-risk opportunity to begin constructing a path toward normalization. Athletic and cultural avenues serve as opportunities to bring societies together, but academic, business, and government officials stand the best chance of finding issues of national importance on which we could share a common focus. 33 Continuing on with our present policy, or further tightening sanctions against Cuba runs counter to this criterion and will sabotage any possibility of agreement between our two countries. Proponents demand democracy, free enterprise, human rights -all noble objectives -unconditionally. We believe such high-level demands only further delay any meaningful interchange between the nations, and prevent the small, incremental steps that are necessary to begin unraveling 40 years of emotional and political distance.
Ambassador Sally Grooms Cowal stated, "Fidel may be looking for a way out, but we won't know until we begin looking at confidence building measures. They've worked with other countries." 34 The immediate diplomatic normalization that some people may be calling for does not provide for the maturation process necessary to resolve important issues. Establishing full diplomatic and political ties, without first finding the necessary common ground, will not resolve deep-seated issues that exist on both sides of the Florida Straits. The low-risk opportunity afforded by Strategic Outreach ensures that issues, while they may be contentious, will be addressed and will not fester.
Strategic Outreach begins with low-level contact, which mitigates the risk of public failure. It is respectful of sovereignty, and focuses on seeking similarities and trustbuilding measures en-route to a mature, normalized relationship.
Diligent investigation of issues is necessary due to complexity.
A critical evaluation point when dealing with any complex issue is how well the proposed solution appeases the interested parties. The U.S. years, it's apparent that a long-term solution will require tenacity, diplomacy, and a willingness to see past the existing emotions.
We believe that immediate normalization would squander an opportunity to address long-standing divisive issues, and would trivialize the importance of those issues.
Another reality is that after 40 years, neither country is prepared to immediately engage and shake hands. As Ambassador Cowal has stated, "The shock to Cuba's system would be too great to bear." 35 And, as Ambassador Dennis Hays, Executive VP of the Cuban American National Foundation also pointed out, the uncertainty of Castro's actions once cash flows into Cuba again should provide caution. 36 While easing some restrictions may be a desirable short-term pursuit, we believe that complete normalization will require an arduous process of negotiation. Coll cited corruption, crime, drugs, property claims, and economic problems as issues the U.S. will likely contend with in the near future. 37 Only Strategic Outreach looks at finding ways to address those issues sooner rather than later.
Must be flexible to allow U.S. to adapt to shifting international landscape. further relax or eliminate the requirement of licensing altogether. 41 The authors believe the point is moot, and that the entire law should be reconsidered for relevance.
It is difficult
We believe that Helms-Burton or the option of tightening sanctions in an attempt to force democratic reform creates an overly restrictive definition of success that disables the President's ability to lead. The 40-year focus has been punitive in nature and fails to take vision of the bigger international picture, the potential end-state, or the dangers of a probable emerging democracy. The present policy wastes the opportunity to capitalize on the shifting world landscape. The events of September 11 th opened the door for the U.S. to explore alliances not before considered. Only Strategic Outreach and its systematic approach to resolving the impasse with Cuba would allow the flexibility to look at Cuba in a new light.
Must begin prior to Castro's demise, to give emerging leaders the opportunity to exert influence.
The authors believe that some flexibility and modification of our US objectives and a focus on long term vs. short-term political goals would reveal that engagement with Cuba, particularly the moderates who stand to gain influence upon Castro's passing, would be time well-spent. Shawn Malone, coordinator of the Cuba Program at the Georgetown University Caribbean Project, states:
"By focusing on punishing Castro, the U.S. hinders its pursuit of key objectives, such as laying the groundwork for better relations with future Cuban leaders… Most problematic is Washington's failure to fully recognize that Cuba's current second-tier leaders -including ministers, vice ministers, military officers and businesspeople -are highly likely to take the reins in a post-Castro era. The U.S. nonetheless limits engagement with these individuals, diminishing the possibility of establishing confidence-building ties that might positively influence a process of change." 42 Cuba perceives continuing with the status quo, or tightening sanctions, as an attempt to subvert from within, which conceivably alienates moderates. (And as Ambassador Hays noted, "Our policy's stated aim is overthrow through peaceful means from within." 43 ) Therefore, our policy keeps us from engaging in two manners: by express isolation, and by encouraging the wholesale dismantling of the present government from within, which offends many of those who could possibly help in the future.
We believe that to ensure stability and remove the cloud of uncertainty, future leaders must be engaged now, before Fidel Castro is gone. moderate's stands a better chance of breaking a 40-year-old deadlock than the continued embargo of material goods.
Must realistically consider the forces of globalization.
In The Lexus And The Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman relates a story that originally appeared in National Geographic, in which the rector of the Cuban Communist Party's Nico Lopez school for advanced studies provides a peek at how globalism has affected even Cuba. When asked to comment on the difficulties of retaining socialism even as capitalist measures were being used to keep the island alive, Raul Valdes Vivo stated, "Cuba is no longer an island. There are no islands anymore. There is only one world." 46 And yet, we know Fidel continues to distance Cuba from the world at large through his rhetoric, and opportunities such as free enterprise and private ownership of businesses by citizens elude the Cuban population.
At the same time, prior to September 11th, President Bush had begun to pursue a path of independence for the U.S. As one scholar has said, "Our global neighborhood needs to be infused with a culture of neighborhood values. The United States attests to this need in some areas of foreign policy, but seems to reserve the right to abandon them when they get in the way of short term national interest considerations as perceived from time to time through domestic political lenses: HelmsBurton legislation, the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, the scrapping of the IBM treaties, opting out of the International Criminal Court -and now, it seems, out of the humanitarian norms of the Vienna convention." 47 What is it that causes these two nations to embrace the concept of globalism yet act in a manner that seems opposed? For the U.S., it is perhaps raw power, an honorable belief in democracy, and a desire for open markets that allow and motivate it to chart its own path; for Cuba, it is perhaps the mindset of a leader desperately holding onto his personal legacy. For both, pursuing a path toward normalization will involve acknowledging the powers shaping the world environment and using them to their advantage. At each step of the process, in the near-, mid-, or long-term, we advocate using the leverage of the greater voice to move ahead. We have recommended Strategic
Outreach as a systematic approach to unravel this Gordian knot in a phased approach:
• In the near term, we advocate allowing universities, think tanks, and the power of citizens and their representatives to help clarify our policy.
• Afterward, we recommend allowing non-governmental organizations • In the long run, we recommend seeking acceptance and legitimacy of our policy by encouraging international organizations -the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, the Organization of American States -to provide the leverage to seek reforms that will bring Cuba into the 21 st century.
We offer recommendations linked to available elements of national power (political/ diplomatic, information, economic, and military). Military power, with the exception of its role as a diplomatic tool, was not considered a realistic tool, and it becomes very clear that a comprehensive approach such as Strategic Outreach will require a careful blending of the tools of influence.
• A bipartisan committee, established by the President, is essential for clarifying our domestic agenda in the near future. The "political/diplomatic" instrument of power is most valuable in achieving a bipartisan assessment of our current domestic goals, as well as realistic foreign policy. The President must reassert his leadership role in foreign policy. His formation of a blue-ribbon panel consisting of congressional members, business leaders, and academicians will signal to the U.S.
population that he will make foreign policy based on national interests and not be held hostage to vocal interest groups. Additionally, such a panel will signal to the world that the U.S. is indeed ready for a more pragmatic relationship with Cuba.
• We recommend the Bush administration take the lead role in assessing the wisdom of our present policy. If President Bush does not lead this effort now his administration may be forced to play catch-up in the near future, for there is widespread momentum in the U.S. Congress for a change in our policy toward Cuba 52 . An ad hoc working group comprising eight Democratic and Republican members of the House of Representatives is pressing for a broader opening to the communist government, and intends to push for increased trade, expanded social exchanges between our two countries, and reversal of the U.S. travel ban policy. and I think the same would be true for any other member of Congress that goes down there." 54 Congress is considering measures that would allow American companies to finance sales to Cuba, further opening the law signed into effect in October 2000 that allowed sales of some food items and medicines to Cuba on a "cash and carry" basis.
Cuba's recent decision to expand purchases of American agricultural products shows that they too may be willing to ease their own hard line rhetoric towards the U.S.
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• We must close the information gap that exists between the nations. Further recommendations, relying heavily on a balance of all instruments of power, can achieve this. As a minimum, academic, artistic and athletic cultural exchanges must be continued, with some additional focus on how they could tie to our policy goals.
• We recommend an increase in our participation in joint medical research with the Cuban medical community. Cuba has long held its medical community up as a shining beacon in the Caribbean basin, and joint efforts in scientific exploration and cooperation must be viewed as a humanitarian endeavor.
• We recommend greater government-to-government contact with moderates in Cuba. Cooperative endeavors to develop and enforce migration policy and stem the flow of drug trafficking have occurred when situations reached crisis levels in the past. We now advocate that greater contact become the norm rather than the exception, and that opportunities be actively sought to bring together government representatives from both countries before crises occur.
• We recommend more emphasis be placed on engaging Cuba's current secondechelon officials. As Cuba's likely future leaders, they must be brought into the dialogue sooner rather than later -the end results will be more productive for both the United States and Cuba. U.S. policy toward Cuba needs to focus on the positive. We should abandon our obsession with the current regime so that we may evaluate and prepare for the challenge and opportunities that are expected to arise in the near future (post-Fidel).
• We should eliminate the remaining restrictions on granting visas to mid-and high-level Cuban government officials and permit (and even encourage) regular communication between them and their U.S. counterparts. This would also serve our stated desire of exposing Cubans to the virtues and benefits of multi-party democracy and free markets.
• We recommend that a national agenda of relevant issues, drawn perhaps from the results of the previously suggested bipartisan commission, be used as fodder to bring together the great minds of both countries to seek common ground.
Issues such as human rights, barriers to economic success, and reparations for nationalized properties offer fertile ground for debate, and ensure that a clear focus is placed on issues vital (and relevant) to our foreign policy. Presently, forums sponsored by universities and think tanks offer the opportunity for each country's government, business, and academic representatives to get together and debate issues.
The expanded use of academic forums is a beneficial opportunity to address these issues.
• Cuba, opponents of the measure ensured that another area of the law was tightenedtravel. We don't believe the consequences of this prohibition have ever been fully considered, nor do we believe the prohibition is justified. To be clear, the authors don't necessarily believe that unilaterally lifting all restrictions is in the U.S.'s best interests; however, some consideration should be given to easing restrictions that punish the Cuban population and prevent U.S. citizens from exercising their own civil rights.
• The U.S. must reframe the issue from a bilateral concern between our nation and Cuba into an opportunity to bring together numerous voices and opinions.
The authors believe the essence of restructuring U.S.-Cuba policy and breaking the impasse lies in reaching out to others and building consensus -on a local, regional, national and international basis.
Clearly, this list of recommendations is not exhaustive. Even as this paper is being completed, former President Carter is assembling a group to travel to Cuba in May 2002, with the express permission of the President and the State Department. The ultimate intent and goals of his mission are unknown at this point. But, Carter will be the highest-
